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The traditional US conception of business entities is that they exist to
earn profits for their equity owners.' Well-developed legal doctrines support
this corporate purpose. 2 But emergent companies seek to earn profits while
pursuing a social mission. One of the many examples is 4ocean, which sells
bracelets made from recycled materials and uses a portion of the profits to
remove one pound of ocean plastic pollution for every bracelet sold.3 The
combination of profits with a social purpose is exciting because it represents
a new way to fund projects for the social good. Unlike charities or nonprofits,
which look primarily to donations, 4 these firms raise money from investors
willing to sacrifice some returns to back a worthy cause. Lawmakers in the
US and abroad are struggling to adopt existing legal structures, which are
based on the for-profit or non-profit paradigm, to best support these so-called
social enterprises.
This Article combines a theoretical and comparative analysis to show
how current efforts to support social enterprise in the United States and
Europe could be improved. Though scholars and regulators on both
continents confront the same issues, the dialogues rarely intersect. 5 This
Article fills this gap in the literature. It defines social enterprises, provides a
framework for social enterprise law, and assesses the extent to which US and
EU laws match this framework. This analysis crystalizes the purposes and
mechanisms of social enterprise law and uncovers potential reforms to
regulations and related legal technologies on both continents.
Professor of Law, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, Faculty of Social Sciences.
Hugh B. Brown Professor of Law, University of Utah, S.J. Quinney College of
Law. The authors received valuable comments on this article at the Ohio State
Business Law Journal's symposium, Corporate Social Responsibility: Maximizing
Shareholder and Community Returns, and at the Deals Conference in Park City,
Utah.
'See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Needfor a Clear-Eyed
Understandingof the Power and Accountability Structure Establishedby the
DelawareGeneral CorporationLaw, 50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 761, 790 (2015).
2 See id
3 40CEAN, https://4ocean.com/ (last visited Sept. 3, 2020) [https://perma.cc/VAC6-

CKWN].
Curtis Child, Whither the Turn? The Ambiguous Nature of Nonprofits'
Commercial Revenue, 89 Soc. FORCES 145, 145-46 (2010).
5 An exception is Jacques Defoumy & Marthe Nyssens, Conceptions of Social
Enterpriseand Social Entrepreneurshipin Europe and the United States:
Convergences and Divergences, 1 J. Soc. ENTREPRENEURSHIP 32 (2010).
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Social enterprises seek to earn profits, but their primary goal is to serve
a public mission. Traditional legal regimes put firms into the for-profit or
non-profit category, and thus fail to fit these hybrid entities. This is a concern
because appropriate regulations are necessary for social enterprises to
develop and thrive.6 Social enterprise laws should make clear that these firms
are unique from others, including for-profit firms that have a social conscious
or contribute to charity.
The key legal principle is that social enterprises put their mission first
7
above profits, employees, and other stakeholders. Social enterprise laws
should require this. They should also put in place a legal structure that
enables, supports, and polices this purpose. There are several primary
regulatory tools for doing so: rules could require that social enterprises
expand participation in corporate governance to include the views of those
most impacted by their mission; impose restrictions on firm expenditures that
do not go towards their mission; and require companies to assess and publicly
disclose their impact on their chosen cause. Companies that follow these
requirements would earn the "social enterprise" moniker, which would
provide an important signal to investors and consumers, and thereby help
these firms raise capital and sell their products and services.
US law has yet to fully embrace social enterprises. There are legal forms,
like the benefit corporation, and certifications, like the B Corp certificate,
which are available to help these firms distinguish themselves from typical
for-profit corporations.' But these legal and nonlegal mechanisms suffer
from several key flaws. First, they blur the distinction between socially
responsible firms and true social enterprises. Socially responsible firms seek
to earn profits in an ethical manner but are not necessarily driven by a social
mission-the sine qua non of social enterprise. This distinction, while often
lost, is an important one because it separates firms with very different goals.
Benefit corporation rules and B Corp certification requirements also fail to
mandate governance structures that align operations with stated ambitions
and do not include transparency measures keyed to assessing the degree of a
firm's positive impact.
The concept of a social enterprise is much more well developed in
Europe. Many EU countries have statutory provisions targeting these firms.
But problems remain. Countries often define social enterprises too narrowly,
fail to mandate appropriate governance structures, and lack transparency
mandates. The divergence among countries creates an additional issue. The
differing legal definitions of social enterprise create difficulties for potential
consumers and investors in the EU region because the entity label alone is
insufficiently descriptive.
Regulation is often criticized as stifling markets, but it is often necessary for them
to effectively function. See Jeff Schwartz, ReconceptualizingInvestment
Management Regulation, 16 GEO. MASON L. REv. 521, 525-27 (2009)
(summarizing market failure analysis of regulatory intervention).
7 See infra pp. 5-8.
8 See infra pp. 27-32.
6
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The EU is seeking to address the disparities with a new proposal. The
rule, if adopted by the European Parliament, would provide entities with a
"European Social Economy" label if they meet certain social-enterprise
criteria. 9 As drafted, the proposal mitigates, but does not eliminate, the risk
of consumer and investor confusion. This is because the recommended
criteria are vague and depend on country-level rulemaking. The proposal
would be far stronger if the rules were more specific. The EU could also go
a step further and create its own social enterprise legal entity patterned on the
European Company, which was created for traditional for-profit firms.
In Part I, this Article defines the term "social enterprise." Part II models
how regulations can best support these companies. Part III uses this model
to review and critique laws related to social enterprises in the US and in the
EU. It also assesses the EU's recent proposal on social enterprise and makes
reform recommendations.
I. "SOCIAL ENTERPRISE"
A fundamental problem when discussing social enterprise is that there
are differing definitions of the term.' 0 Additionally, "social enterprise" is
frequently defined in one way with examples that then belie the definition.
This lack of clarity frustrates efforts to create legal technologies" that
support these companies.
For example, the Social Enterprise Alliance defines these businesses as
"[oirganizations that address a basic unmet need or solve a social or
environmental problem through a market-driven approach." 2 The definition
seems to apply only to companies with a business model that directly
addresses a social problem. The most famous example of a business like this
is Grameen Bank, which provides microloans to the poor, and won the 2006

9 European Parliament Resolution of 5 July 2018 With Recommendations to the
Commission on a Statute for Social and Solidarity-Based Enterprises
(2016/2237(INL)).
'0 See Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms of Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY
L.J. 681, 681 (2013) ("Social enterprise is a hotly contested term."); Joan MacLeod
Hem inway, Let's Not Give Up on TraditionalFor-ProfitCorporationsfor
SustainableSocialEnterprise, 86 UMKC L. REV. 779, 779 (2018) ("Definitions of
social enterprise abound in legal scholarship and elsewhere."); Alina S. Ball, Social
EnterpriseGovernance, 18 U. PA. L. REV. 919, 926 (2016) ("The term 'social
enterprise' does not have a precise definition and as such, while often used, it is
also commonly misunderstood."),
" We use the term "legal technologies" to include both legal and quasi-legal
mechanisms that support social enterprise. A legal technology would include both
privately issued certificates, such as the B Corp certification, and government
regulations.
12 SoC. ENTER. ALL., SOCIAL ENTERPRISE: WHAT IS A SOCIAL ENTERPRISE?, SOC.

ENTER. ALL. https://socialenterprise.us/about/social-enterprise/ (last visited Sept. 3,
2020) [https://perma.cc/62M6-49FL].
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Nobel Peace Prize for its efforts.' 3 The Alliance's example list, however,
includes companies that engage in traditional commerce, but give a portion
of their profits to charity.' 4 Members also include companies that claim an
15
ethical business model. BellaNove, for instance, rents maternity clothes.
The company markets this as a more ethical model for such clothes because
16
the alternative is to buy inexpensive clothes and then throw them away.
While there seems to be an inclination to have a big-tent definition of social
enterprise, we take a different approach.
A primary contribution of social enterprise law is to enable companies
with a true social mission to distinguish themselves. Social enterprises must
stand out from other types of business to market themselves to both
consumers and investors.17 Customers might be more willing to buy, or pay
a little extra for, a product that supports a social cause. Similarly, investors
may be willing to accept slightly lower returns because of the satisfaction
they get from supporting a mission-driven firm. Ambiguity around the exact
meaning of "social enterprise" compromises this potential.
We define social enterprises as investor-owned companies that are
mission-driven rather than profit-driven." Like Grameen bank, they might
directly and creatively address a social problem. But they might also sell
goods and services to support broader social goals. An example is Warby
Parker. The company sells eyeglasses online and in stores. For every pair it
sells, it donates a pair to the needy. According to the company, "[a]lleviating
the problem of impaired vision is at the heart of what we do .... "19
It may be tempting to limit the term social enterprise to only companies
like Grameen, but they are more accurately described as social entrepreneurs.
These companies try to solve social problems in a new, usually marketdriven, way. But they are a subset of social enterprise. Others engage in
See id
141d; see, e.g., EVERLY, Giving Back, http://everlyclothing.com/giving-back/ (last
visited Sept. 3, 2020) (describing Everly, a women's clothing line that donates to a
community-development nonprofit) [https://perma.cc/YPC2-GDAU].
'* Lauren Dekleva, Maternity Clothing Just Got a Fashionable(& Ethical)
Faceli, SOC. ENTER. ALL. (Mar. 1, 2019),
https://socialenterprise.us/2019/03/01/maternity-clothing-just-got-a-fashionableethical-facelift/ [https://perma.cc/QXJ3-ETT3].
'3

16 See id.
17 See Reiser, supra note 10, at 684.
1 Others have used similar definitions. See, e.g., EuR. COMM'N, A MAP OF SOCIAL
ENTERPRISES AND THEIR ECO-SYSTEMS IN EUROPE V (2015) (requiring that social

enterprises have, among other things, a "primary and explicit social purpose");
Defourny & Nyssens, supra note 5, at 44 ("[A]ccording to the EMES conception of
social enterprise, the social impact on the community is not just a consequence or a
side-effect of the economic activity but it is the key motive of the latter."); Reiser,
supra note 10, at 681 (defining a social enterprise as "an organization formed to
achieve social goals using business methods.").
19 Buy a Pair, Give a Pair, WARBY PARKER, https://www.warbyparker.com/buy-apair-give-a-pair (last visited Sept. 3, 2020) [https://perma.cc/633U-7JFM].
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commerce to serve charitable causes, even if their commercial activities are
unrelated to their cause.
Companies that neither innovate to serve a social mission nor donate
significant proceeds to charity are not social enterprises. Patagonia, for
instance, makes expensive outdoor gear. It gives one percent of its revenues
to environmental charities, 20 treats its employees well,2 1 and manufactures its
products sustainably. 22 While all of this is admirable, the company does not
pursue a social cause. It is an example of a profit-seeking company that
operates in a socially responsible manner.
It is difficult, yet important, to draw this distinction. A company that
strives to be a good citizen is not the same as one that is committed to a
certain social goal. Social enterprises are good corporate citizens, but good
corporate citizens are not necessarily social enterprises. It is not always easy
to distinguish between companies like Patagonia, which make products in a
socially responsible way and give back to the community, and companies
like Warby Parker, which make products in a socially responsible way to give
back to the community, especially because companies might inflate
descriptions of their social agenda as part of their marketing efforts. But
regulation can draw this line-companies that comply with specific legal
criteria could earn the right to be called "social enterprises"; those that do not
are merely (yet still laudably) socially conscious and can be otherwise
recognized as such. Regulation can create an operational definition that
supplants the somewhat intractable abstract one.2 These firms would be
defined by what they do rather than by how they describe themselves. This
way the "social enterprise" label would send a clear signal to the market.
Similarly, employee-owned companies are not social enterprises. Nor
are companies that include stakeholder input in corporate decision-making.
Calling these firms social enterprises mistakes inclusive governance for a
social mission. Firms are not social enterprises unless their social mission is
their raison d'dtre.
Finally, nonprofits are not social enterprises. The key distinction is that
nonprofits do not have equity owners. 24 Income over expenses must be

%forthe Planet, PATAGONIA, https://www.patagonia.com/one-percent-for-theplanet.html_(last visited Sept. 3, 2020) [https://perma.cc/NZ9Q-8797].
21 Brigid Schulte, A Company that Profits as it Pampers Workers, WASH. POST
(Oct. 25, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/a-company-thatprofits-as-it-pampers-workers/2014/10/22/d3321 b34-4818-11 e4-b72ed60a9229cc10_story.html [https://perma.cc/5JDG-QRMY].
22 Our Footprint, PATAGONIA, https://www.patagonia.com/our-footprint/ (last
visited Sept. 3, 2020) [https://perma.cc/C5QA-RNGJ].
23 This is similar to how the EU treats corporate purpose. As discussed infra pp.
12-13, corporate purpose is seen as stemming from governance structure.
24 See Reiser, supranote 10,
at 686.
20
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25
reinvested back in the nonprofit's business. Social enterprises have owners
that expect some monetary return in addition to the psychic return they enjoy
for backing a good cause. This is a key innovation and the cause of much of
the complexity of social enterprise law. Also, social enterprise connotes a
firm that solely engages in market activities. Nonprofits, on the other hand,
26
typically rely on donations or grants for all or much of their funding.
Although social enterprises and nonprofits are closely related, distinguishing
them fits with how the terms are understood, at least implicitly. For example,
a nonprofit hospital or school is not typically thought of as a social enterprise.
And social enterprises are typically thought of as companies that earn at least
some profit. 27
In fact, the distinction from nonprofits is what makes social enterprises
exciting, even revolutionary. Because nonprofits cannot have outside
investors, they must fund their activities through cash flows, donations, and
government support.28 This is a limited pool of capital. Thus, it inevitably
limits the scale of these ventures. Adding investors to the funding mix opens
the door to more social good. This is the key reason why regulators should
take these ventures seriously and design legal rules that provide them with
support.

II. A FRAMEWORK FOR SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW

Social enterprise law should provide legal technologies that allow
investor-owned firms with a social mission to thrive. To that end, the law
should require that the first-order purpose of these companies be to serve a
social mission, and that firms adhere to accountability and transparency
mechanisms that police adherence to this purpose. Firms that comply should
earn recognition as "social enterprises"-a clear signal of their beneficent
intentions to consumers and investors.
Since entity law is largely enabling, it is tempting to think that
entrepreneurs can create social enterprises within the existing for-profit legal
structure. In addition to laying out a framework for social-enterprise law,
this Section demonstrates that private ordering is inadequate.
2

See Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835,
838 (1980) ("A nonprofit organization is, in essence, an organization that is barred
from distributing its net earnings, if any, to individuals who exercise control over it,
such as members, officers, directors, or trustees.").
26
See Child, supra note 4, at 146.
27 Cf EUR. COMM'N, supranote 18, at v (distinguishing social enterprises from
nonprofits).
28
Nonprofits can borrow money, but it is difficult and expensive because they do
not have an equity cushion and may lack significant collateral. Deborah Kolsovsky
& Sylvia Diez, Nonprofits See IncreasingNeed to Borrow, N.C. ST. UNIV.:
PHILANTHROPY J. (Apr. 10, 2017),

https://pj.news.chass.ncsu.edu/2017/04/1 0/nonprofits-see-increasing-need-toborrow/ [https://perma.cc/CR4R-NK4Y].
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A. Mission-DrivenPurpose

'

Laws should mandate that social enterprises put the firm's social mission
above shareholder wealth or even stakeholder values. The way that we have
defined social enterprises, they operate with a corporate purpose that is
fundamentally at odds with for-profit corporations. This is true regardless of
whether the for-profit company adheres to the shareholder primacy or
stakeholder model of the firm. This leads to tension with traditional
corporate laws and norms.
Much of the literature on corporate purpose and social enterprise starts
from the false premise that the US requires for-profit companies to put
shareholder interests first (in adherence with the shareholder primacy model)
while European countries direct firms to look out for stakeholders. 29 While
the story in both regions is more subtle, neither approach fits social
enterprises.
It is true that the leading theory in US corporate law,"which is dominated
by Delaware jurisprudence, is that the purpose of a corporation is to
maximize shareholder value. 30 It is also true that the default rule is that
managers are required to run firms in accordance with this maxim. 3
Compliance, however, is measured by reference to "long-term shareholder
value." 32 This metric is consistent with many stakeholder interests. For
example, treating the environment well is good for almost all companies in
the long term. Thus, stakeholder-oriented actions are permissible so long as
they are defended on the grounds of shareholder primacy.3 3
Such flexibility, however, does not give firms sufficient latitude to put a
social mission first. Devotion to a social mission means subjugating profits.
While keeping stakeholders happy is often, at least arguably, consistent with
long-term shareholder value, prioritization of a social mission at the expense
of shareholders is not.
Social enterprises would have to change the default structure, but the
legality of doing so is unclear. Delaware law gives entrepreneurs the freedom
to alter the corporation's purpose in the company's Certificate of
Incorporation.34 This likely gives founders room to state that they intend to

29

See Reiser, supra note 10, at 683.
Jeff Schwartz, De FactoShareholderPrimacy, 79 MD. L. REV. 652, 669

30 See

(2020).
3' See id
32 See id at 670.
33
See id
34 DEL. CODE tit.

8, § 102(a)(3) (2020) ("It shall be sufficient to state, either alone
or with other businesses or purposes, that the purpose of the corporation is to
engage in any lawful act or activity for which corporations may be organized under
the General Corporation Law of Delaware .... ").
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balance stakeholder interests.3 5 It is uncertain, however, whether they can go
further and explicitly elevate the firm's social mission above profits. In
finding that the founders of craigslist acted improperly in prioritizing the
firm's social mission, the Delaware Supreme Court stated as follows:
The corporate form in which craigslist operates . . . is not an appropriate
vehicle for purely philanthropic ends, at least not when there are other
stockholders interested in realizing a return on their investment. Jim and
Craig opted to form craigslist, Inc. as a for-profit Delaware corporationand
voluntarily accepted millions of dollars from eBay as part of a transaction
whereby eBay became a stockholder. Having chosen a for-profit corporate
form, the craigslist directors are bound by the fiduciary duties and standards
that accompany that form. Those standards include acting to promote the
value of the corporation for the benefit of its stockholders. The "Inc." after
36
the company name has to mean at least that.
The implication from the above is that for-profit firms are for profit, and
that this means promoting shareholder wealth. This would seem to foreclose
the adoption of a social purpose. The court does create some ambiguity when
it says that "philanthropic ends" are inappropriate "when there are other
37
This
stockholders interested in realizing a return on their investment."
suggests that if the shareholders unanimously adopt a Certificate of
Incorporation that envisions a social purpose for the firm, it would be
respected.
Nevertheless, a social enterprise is an awkward fit under existing forprofit corporate rules. There are also deeper structural issues with forming a
social enterprise as a corporation. Corporate law embeds shareholder values.
The law is primarily about rendering management accountable to
shareholders. Shareholders vote for board members to represent their
interests. This governance structure is ill-suited for firms that wish to focus
on their social mission.
Moreover, under corporate law, management owes fiduciary duties of
loyalty and care. In general, this means that they must put the corporation's
interest above their own and that they must diligently handle their
responsibilities. Shareholders enforce these obligations. In the social
enterprise context, management will often face the tradeoff between profits
and mission. Fiduciary duties as they are typically understood would require
managers to put profits first.38 Even if founders explicitly state a mission-

See Strine, supranote 1, at 783 ("It may well be the case that a certificate of
incorporation that said that a for-profit corporation would put other constituencies'
interests on par with stockholders would, in view of § 101(b), be respected and
supersede the corporate common law.").
36 eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 34 (Del. Ch. 2010).
3? Id.
38 See id.
3
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centric purpose, they could not change fiduciary duties to align.3 9 Moreover,
even if they could, shareholders may not vigilantly enforce this obligation.
There would be an inherent bias towards profitmaking, which founders
would not be able to erase through clever drafting.
The availability of limited liability entities ("LLCs") solves many of
these structural issues, but this legal form is not a panacea. These entities
were designed to provide wide-ranging flexibility to entrepreneurs. Thus, an
agreement among all of the parties that the firm exists to form a social
purpose is likely uncontroversial. 40 Entrepreneurs could also restructure
fiduciary duties and firm governance to better align with their social mission.
The very flexibility that LLCs allow, however, is also a drawback.
Creating a structure to render management accountable to a public mission
looks far different in a social enterprise. And each entrepreneur is tasked
with figuring out an optimal structure. A legal regime that puts in place a
default structure for social enterprise would eliminate these costs. Similarly,
investors would have to carefully inspect the terms of each social-enterprise
LLC to determine precisely how it is set up. This increases their costs and
may lead to mistrust, thus chilling the market. In the end, the transaction
costs savings that supports a default structure for traditional firms apply with
equal force to social enterprises.
Traditional Company Law in the EU is similarly inappropriate for social
enterprises. While the EU is much more amenable to stakeholder values,41 it
is not designed for firms that wish to put a social mission first. Unlike in the
United States, there is no robust debate about shareholder primacy versus
stakeholder theory; the distinction is operational rather than abstract.4 2 Firms
serve stakeholders to the extent their interests are represented in corporate
governance and protected under company law.4 3 Germany is the leading
European example of stakeholder oriented company law. Management owes
fiduciary duties to stakeholders rather than just shareholders."

&

" Delaware law limits the extent to which fiduciary duties can be altered. See Ann
E. Conaway, Lessons to Be Learned: How the Policy of Freedom to Contractin
Delaware'sAlternative Entity Law Might Inform Delaware's GeneralCorporation
Law, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L 789, 794-95 n.15 (2008).
41 See Reiser, supra note 10, at 688-89.
4 Jurgens et al., Stakeholder Theory and Practice in Europe and North America:
The Key to Success Lies in a Marketing Approach, 39 INDUS. MKTG. MGMT. 769,
772 (2010); Veronique Magnier & Darren Rosenblum, Quotas and the
TransatlanticDivergence of CorporateGovernance, 34 Nw. J. INT'L. L. & BUS.
249, 275-76, 297 (2014).
.42 Jurgens et al., supranote 41, at 771 ("The strategies of European firms, on the
other hand, aim to meet the needs of those stakeholders with vested interests in the
company's welfare by assuring those groups board representation."); Magnier
Rosenblum, supra note 41, at 275-76.
43 See Jurgens et al., supra note 41, at 771.
" See Amir N. Licht, The Maximands of CorporateGovernance: A Theory of
Values and Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 649, 735 (2004).
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As noted above, however, inclusivity and stakeholderism are not
synonymous with social enterprise. There is still a void for social enterprise
to fill. As in the US, European countries tend to have two broad categories
of for-profit entities-one where law is more restrictive and one which
45
Where law provides more
provides entrepreneurs greater flexibility.
a social enterprise mission
to
adopt
firms
for
possible
be
may
it
flexibility,
law is useful. As
enterprise
social
so,
Even
it.
support
and internal rules that
and provides
costs
noted, it allows entrepreneurs to economize on transaction
46
The prevalence of social
a clear signal to consumers and investors.
enterprise laws in the EU implicitly acknowledges the value of distinguishing
these companies even where stakeholder theory predominates and even
where firms have the flexibility to alter their governing documents.
The starting point of social enterprise law-and where it first diverges
47
Management
from existing entity law-is a clear mission-first mandate.
would have a duty to put the firm's mission first, and governance and
accountability rules that support this duty.

B. Mission-Driven Firm Governance
Social enterprises should have governance structures that support and
align with their social missions. As in for-profit firms, the law should require
social enterprises to have a board that oversees and selects managers. That
board should be elected by a mix of constituents, potentially including
management, employees, customers, shareholders, and direct representatives
of the company's mission.
Social enterprises face several key governance challenges. There are the
familiar risks that management will put their interest ahead of the company
through expropriation or shirking. More importantly, there is also the risk
that they will improperly balance mission and profits. The most prevalent
48
fear is that managers will overemphasize profits; but they might also focus
so much on the mission that the business becomes unviable or other
stakeholders are harmed. To mitigate the risk of management veering off
course, social enterprises should have a board of directors consisting of those
who share a common interest in the firm's mission but have otherwise varied
interests. The common interest in the mission would elevate it above all other
45 See Klaus J. Hopt, Directors' Duties and Shareholders'Rights in the European
Union: Mandatory and/or Default Rules? 2 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working
Paper No. 312/2016, 2016),
https://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2749237
[https://perma.cc/Q8RA-WDJM].
46

See supra p. 8.

47 Professor Reiser has also made this suggestion. See Reiser, supra note 10, at
704.
48 Alnoor Ebrahim et al., The Governance ofSocial Enterprises: Mission Drift and
Accountability Challenges in Hybrid Organizations, 34 RSCH. IN ORGANIZATIONAL

BEHAV. 81, 82 (2014).
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goals, and the diverse views would guide a balanced approach for pursuing
it.
Those directly tied to the firm's social cause are an obvious choice for
board representation because they would focus solely on the firm's social
mission. It might be difficult, however, to foster their direct participation.
Whether it is possible, and who the participants might be, depends on the
firm. For instance, Grameen's social mission is to provide microloans to the
poor. To represent the mission, the company could allow these borrowers to
nominate board members. Along the same lines, firms that give to specific
charities could allow representatives of the recipient charities to elect board
members. But in some social enterprises, there may be no obvious group to
fill this role. If this is the case, firms should be required to devise another
mechanism for their input, perhaps through surveys or impact studies. 4 9
Managers and workers should also be given a say. Since they chose to
work for a social enterprise, likely at reduced wages, the firm's mission is
undoubtedly important to them. At the same time, because they work there,
they also care about employee satisfaction and firm viability.
In the United States, the typical way that employees gain a voice in
corporate affairs is through employee stock ownership plans. This makes
employees shareholders, which gives them a say in who is elected to the
board. This mechanism is a poor fit to social enterprise, though, in that it
aligns employee interest with shareholders rather than the company's
mission.
European firms incorporate employee views in a more direct manner.
German firms, for instance, are required to have works councils. 50 These
councils negotiate collective bargaining agreements and must be consulted
on layoffs, plant closings, and related activities, as well as on fundamental
changes to the company's business.5 1 In addition, under the German system
of codetermination, public firms are run by a two-tiered board structure.5 2
The management board oversees day-to-day operations; the supervisory
board appoints members of the management board and approves major
corporate decisions.53 Employees elect representatives to this latter board.
In companies with over 2,000 employees, they elect half of the board. 4

49

5 Seeid

at 93.

See Katharine V. Jackson, Towards a Stakeholder-shareholderTheory of
CorporateGovernance:A ComparativeAnalysis, 7 HASTINGS BUS. L. J. 309, 367-

68(2011).
si Id
52
Id at 367.
* See Jodie A. Kirshner, "An Ever Closer Union"? in CorporateIdentity?: A
TransatlanticPerspective on Regional Dynamics and the Societas Europaea, 84
ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1273, 1328 (2010); Other countries, including Austria,
Portugal, and Poland, also have two-tiered board structures. Klaus J. Hopt,
Comparative CorporateGovernance: The State of the Art and International
Regulation, 59 AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 20-21 (2011).
s See Kirshner, supra note 53, at 1332.
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Other European countries have oversight models that similarly incorporate
employees into corporate governance." These approaches, where employees
can represent their own interest through voting rights as employees qua
56
employees, would be a cleaner way to incorporate their views.
Customers should also participate. Companies are constantly surveying
their customers on various matters. Although it might not be feasible for all
firms, it is easy to imagine them sending customers voting materials on board
representatives. Their customers have an interest in the quality and prices of
the company's products, and because they chose to do business with a
particular social enterprise, they likely also have a connection to its cause.
These balanced wishes make them a valuable governance voice.
The final vote should come from shareholders. They have an interest in
profits, and like customers, they also likely have a connection to the firm's
cause because they chose to invest.
A board so constituted would provide oversight and select managers that
focus on the firm's mission without ignoring other stakeholder values. Social
enterprises should, therefore, be required to include representatives of these
groups on their boards. If it is infeasible to include customers or direct
representatives of the firm's mission, then rules should require companies to
57
otherwise incorporate their views.
" See id. at 1290.
56 The EU, however, did not fully embrace the stakeholder-oriented corporate
governance model. After 40 years of negotiation, it created the Societas Europaea,
a legal form for use anywhere in the EU. See id. at 1289. Companies that choose
this form need not adopt a two-tiered board with employee participation. See id. at

1291.
57 Nonprofits face a similar governance dilemma. Their mission is their primary
objective, but they must earn enough to remain viable. Since there are no
shareholders, the typical way of electing board members is inapt. Some nonprofits
have members, usually donors. Lawrence J. Trautman & Janet Ford, Nonprofit
Governance: The Basics, 52 AKRON L. REv. 971, 975 (2018). They may elect
board members. Id at 1001. Much more commonly, board members are appointed
by founders, and then reappoint themselves. See Stephen R. Block & Steven
Rosenberg, Toward an Understandingof Founder'sSyndrome: An Assessment of

Power and Privilege Among Foundersof Nonprofit Organizations,

NONPROFIT

MGMT. AND LEADERSHIP, 357-58 (June 2002),

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 2 2 7 9 5 2 3 2 4 TowardanUnderstanding
ofFounder's SyndromeAnAssessmentof_ Powerand Privilege AmongFoun
ders_of_NonProfitOrganizations [https://perma.cc/JWC9-UQZQ]. In either case,
the board is commonly made up of inside directors (i.e., management) and donors.
See Greg McRay, Nonprofit BoardMembers - Choose Wisely, FOUND. GRP. (May
4, 2017), https://www.501 c3.org/nonprofit-board-members-choose-wisely/
[https://perma.cc/5QR2-FLBT]. As in social enterprises, because managers have
chosen to work for a mission-driven company, they likely internalize the values of
the nonprofit's social cause (though there may be problems of self-dealing or
shirking as they are being asked to oversee themselves). Alan J. Abramson & Kara

C. Billings, Challenges FacingSocial Enterprises in the United States, NONPROFIT
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C. Mission-DrivenFinancialLimits
An additional option to render management accountable to the
company's mission is to legally restrict the company's spending on other
things. Regulations could accomplish this by keying regulations to certain
balance sheet items.
One approach, which is common in existing social enterprise laws in
Europe," is to limit the percentage of profits paid out to shareholders as
dividends. 59 While the idea is to prevent value appropriation by shareholders,
it is an imprecise mechanism for doing so. Shareholders profit from the
growth of the business regardless of whether money is paid out to them. In
addition, while dividend limits force companies to retain earnings, there is
no guarantee that the money will be spent wisely. Firms might, for instance,
spend resources on lower value projects or overpay employees.
A better approach would be to target internal use of profits and
profitability. In the common social enterprise model, where the company's
commercial activities fund, but are not directly related to, its social
ambitions, there could be a requirement that a certain percentage of profits
from its sales go toward its charitable goals. A rule that required that the
donation equal some percentage of the company's profits would cement the
importance of the social mission. While a requirement that is too onerous
would threaten to leave companies without sufficient money to run their
operations, at a minimum, fifty-one percent of a firm's profits should go
toward its mission for it to legitimately claim that it puts mission first.
For social entrepreneurs (i.e., firms that serve their mission through their
commercial activities, rather than use commercial activities as a way to fund
pursuit of their mission), a limit on profit margin, rather than profits
themselves, would be a better fit. These firms contribute to the social good
directly through their activities, not through how they allocate their profits,
so a limit on profit distribution would not fit. For instance, it would make
little sense to instruct Grameen to allocate fifty-one percent of its profits to
its social cause. Its business is its social cause.
Profit margin is a profitability ratio that divides profit by revenues. It
shows the relationship between price and costs. A profit margin of fifteen
percent means that eighty-five percent of the company's revenues are spent
to generate its profits. If social entrepreneurs have a high profit margin, it
suggests that they are prioritizing profits at the expense of their mission. If
POL'Y F. 4 (2019) (addressing governance challenges specifically as they relate to
accountability); Ball, supra note 10, at 937-42 (noting the lack of internal oversight
within nonprofits). Similarly, donors represent a reasonably good proxy for the
nonprofit's social mission. They want to see that their money is being well spent.
58 See infra notes 120-124 and accompanying text.
59 This limitation is also employed in the United Kingdom, where community
interest companies (CIC) may only pay out 35% of their profits as dividends.
Ebrahim et al., supra note 48, at 86.
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Grameen has a high profit margin on its loans, it would suggest that it is not
charging fair rates to its impoverished clients. If a restaurant that employs
people with disabilities has high profit margins, it suggests it is not paying
its employees enough.
Profit margins vary by firm, but the S&P 500 average hovers around
A profit-margin limitation of something like ten percent
eleven percent.
may, therefore, be reasonable. It would require that social entrepreneurs be
no more profitable than the average large public company.

D. Mission-DrivenDisclosures
A final tool is disclosure. A way to police a company's devotion to its
social mission is to require that it disclose the attainment of, or progress
toward, its social purposes. Since these companies are established to aid the
public good, these disclosures should be publicly available. Disclosures are
best if they are clear, consistent, and comparable. Because missions are
diverse, however, this is difficult in the social enterprise space. That said,
there are two key ways that companies can track progress toward their social
goals. The first is to measure their outputs-the steps taken toward their
social mission. In Grameen's case, this would be the number and value of
loans they make. The second would be the company's impact on social
welfare. This is more abstract. For Grameen, it would mean an assessment
of the status of those who receive the loans. Were the loans able to lift people
from poverty? 6 1
Though the securities laws require financial disclosures from public
companies,62 and shareholders have the right to demand information in

a

John Butters, S&P 500 Reports YOY Decline in Net Profit Marginfor 4th
StraightQuarter, FACTSET tbl. 1 (Jan. 21, 2020), https://insight.factset.com/sp-500reports-yoy-decline-in-net-profit-margin-for-4th-straight8 2
2
quarter#:~:text=The%20blended%20net%20profit%20margin,Q4% 0200 % 0thr
ough%20Q3%202009 [https://perma.cc/L6E8-WW35].
61 See Ebrahim et al., supra note 48, at 87 (discussing output and outcome metrics).
62 See Jeff Schwartz, Fairness, Utility, and Market Risk, 89 OR. L. REv. 175, 176
(2008). The U.S. generally does not require socially-oriented disclosures of public
companies, but the EU rules are more expansive. They define a category of
companies as "public-interest entities." These are listed companies, banks,
insurance companies, and companies otherwise designated by member states as
such. See Directive 2014/56/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of
16 April 2014 Amending Directive 2006/43/EC on Statutory Audits of Annual
Accounts and Consolidated Accounts, 2014 O.J. (L158/196). Public-interest
entities with over 500 employees are required to disclose information related to,
among other things, environmental and employee matters, as well as human rights
and board diversity. See Directive 2014/95/EU of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 22 October 2014 Amending Directive 2013/34/EU as Regards
Disclosure of Non-Financial and Diversity Information By Certain Large

Undertakings and Groups, 4014 O.J. (L 330/1); EuR. COMM'N, NONFINANCIAL
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private firms, 63 private firms face no ongoing disclosure requirement like the
one proposed here." It may seem, therefore, that social enterprises would be
subjected to a heightened level of scrutiny.
The justification has to do with the unique nature of social enterprise law.
Compliance therewith allows firms to earn recognition as a "social
enterprise." Unlike the generic "corporation" status that is conferred on
typical for-profit firms, the social enterprise moniker carries an important
message. Transparency around the firm's efforts and progress towards its
social mission is necessary for that message to have credibility.
The direct audience for these disclosures would be the stakeholders of
the firm. But making the disclosures public also allows for social-enterprise
intermediaries to consume them and publish their results.
Several
organizations, for example, dissect corporate sustainability disclosures and
rank companies based on them. 65

E. Social Mission Lock-In
Firms founded on high-minded ideals may gravitate towards profitmaking as management turns over and shares change hands. This is a
common concern in the field. 66 It is particularly worrisome if there is ever to
be a public market for social enterprises. This may be hard to imagine, but
there is no conceptual reason why social enterprises cannot have their shares
trade on a regulated exchange.
The public markets have traditionally been an important source of capital
for emerging firms. 67 Public markets also offer shareholders liquidity, which
increases the value of firm shares. 68 Both the access to capital and the
liquidity would be valuable to social enterprises. If this is to ever happen,

REPORTING, https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/company-reportingand-auditing/company-reporting/non-fmancial-reporting en (last visited Sept. 3,
2020) [https://perma.cc/RD29-S8QF]. Many are pushing for EU-style disclosures
in the US. See, e.g., Alexandra Farmer & Sarah Thompson, The Ripple Effect of
EU Taxonomy for Sustainable Investments in U.S. FinancialSector, HARV. L. SCH.
F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE (June 10, 2020),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2020/06/10/the-ripple-effect-of-eu-taxonomy-forsustainable-investments-in-u-s-financial-sector/ [https://perma.cc/8F9D-C26B]
("As U.S. investors increasingly take ESG factors, and particularly climate change,
into account, they should monitor and, where warranted, incorporate emerging EU
guidelines.").

See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 671.
id
65 Jill E. Fisch, Making Sustainability Disclosure Sustainable, 107 GEO. L.J. 923,
945-46
(2019).
66
63

6 See

See Ebrahim et al., supra note 48, at 82.
See Jeff Schwartz, The Twilight of Equity Liquidity, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 531,
538 (2012).
67

68

See id at 537.
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though, laws must make it extremely difficult to pivot from mission to
profits.
In today's public markets, the pressure on companies to maximize share
prices is intense. They face pressure from institutional investors to generate
ever growing quarterly returns; 69 hedge-fund activists threaten managers that
70
Moving
fail to do everything they can to squeeze profits for shareholders.
a social enterprise off of its mission and towards the goal of maximizing
profits would make for easy gains.
Etsy is a case in point. It was founded as a quirky, stakeholder-oriented
7
firm, that sells crafts made by independent artists online. ' When it went
public, it prided itself on its corporate culture, which put the interests of
72
Shortly after going
employees and craftspeople ahead of shareholders.
73
The activist forced the
public, it was attacked by a hedge fund activist.
74
company to fire the CEO and significantly cut staff.
Rules that keep firms from abandoning their social mission would
provide the necessary insulation from market pressure. The constitution of
the board described above provides a natural barrier. Since shareholders
would not make up the majority of the board, they could not force a shift in
the firm's mission. Other measures could provide additional reassurance. If
managers owed a mandatory fiduciary duty to advance the mission of the
social enterprise, then it would be impossible for hedge funds to buy up
stakes and force different policies. In an extreme case, a fund could seek to
reincorporate a social enterprise as a for-profit firm. To prevent that, laws
could be put in place regarding what vote is required and who is given the
right to vote, that could make this essentially impossible. For instance,
perhaps the move could require consent of seventy-five percent of the
employees.
While a flexible organizational structure is essential for social enterprises
because of their varied structures and goals, certain mandatory rules that
cement mission over profits provide necessary assurance that firms will stay
true to their social-purpose goals.

F. The Contributionsof Social EnterpriseLaw
The key contribution of social enterprise-the pursuit of a public mission
with private investors-is an ill fit with traditional corporate law.. These
companies are not driven by profits; nor are they profit-driven firms that
strive to do business sustainably. They are driven by their social mission.
Unlike nonprofits, though, they have investors and strive to provide them

See Schwartz, supra note 30, at 688.
70 See id at 679.
71 See id at 656.
72 See id
7 See id.
69

74 See id
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with a return. Social enterprise law can help social enterprises through rules
designed with their unique structure and purpose in mind.
Essentially the same logic that supports corporate law as distinct from
contract law also supports the need for social enterprise law. Corporate law
is efficient because it provides a structure that works for most firms. The law
frees entrepreneurs from the need to derive a system of corporate governance
and related rules from scratch. It also serves to protect investors. The system
corporate law puts in place provides them with tools to police firm managers.
The same is true in social enterprises. Without a legal structure devoted to
social enterprises, firms would be forced to contract for a social-enterprise
structure within the for-profit corporate-law paradigm. It is inefficient to
force firms to do this and leaves investors and other stakeholders potentially
exposed.
Just as importantly, social enterprise laws can provide these companies
with clear and credible ways to distinguish themselves from purely for-profit
entities and entities like Patagonia, which have varying degrees of social
mindedness, but are not social enterprises. Many investors and consumers
are drawn to companies with a social mission. A significant number of
Warby Parker's customers likely buy glasses from them to support their
cause. Compliance with social enterprise law can help companies like this
signal their charitable intentions. A firm would only be permitted to call
itself a "social enterprise" if it is committed to a social mission and complies
with the legally imposed accountability structure that supports it. Different
legal technologies are available to provide this structure.

G. Mechanisms of Social EnterpriseLaw
There are two ways to provide a legal (or lawlike) structure for social
enterprises. One approach is to layer certifications on existing legal rules for
conventional for-profit firms. The other is to create a new type of legal entity.
A key contribution of both is that founders of social enterprises would no
longer need to individually adjust the corporate default rules to meet their
needs. The certificate or legal framework would also provide accountability
and credibility to firms that call themselves social enterprises. Under either
system, companies would commit themselves to a social mission and obey
rules that backstop that commitment.
Because they would impose a social-enterprise structure on these firms,
certificates are an improvement over pure private ordering. But there are two
key reasons to prefer the legal-entity approach. The first is that the necessary
alterations to corporate purpose and the fiduciary and structural obligations
that underpin it may not be valid under U.S. state laws. As noted above, it is
unclear whether Delaware corporations can completely reject their for-profit
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roots. 75 And even if they could, firms could not change fiduciary duties to
elevate mission over profits. 76
This problem does not exist with LLCs, and other states may not be as
rigid as Delaware. Nevertheless, this means the certificate would have
different legal implications based on where firms are incorporated and the
underlying legal entity. For example, only some certified companies would
have fiduciary duties that align with their missions. The legal uncertainty
undermines the value of the certification. An EU-wide certificate would run
into a similar problem. Its value would be compromised because it would
depend on how the certification interacts with the laws of member states,
which may have lower or higher social enterprise standards or no social
enterprise law at all. A new legal entity, in contrast, would provide clarity of
purpose and structure.
There is also a more fundamental problem with certificates when they
are granted to for-profit firms. It sends the wrong signal. This is an example
77
of how law can have an expressive function. Laws may "convey a social
meaning that reinforces or changes the norms of a community, beyond its
role in establishing and enforcing rules."" When awarded to a for-profit
company, the certificate implies that a company is basically for-profit, but
with a social conscience. A new type of company, on the other hand,
suggests that there is something completely different happening. And social
enterprises are completely different. Their involvement in commerce is a
means to a social end rather than to profits. As discussed above, the concept
of a for-profit firm is fundamentally at odds with social enterprise. Social
enterprises are not "for profit."
Layering a social enterprise certification on top of a for-profit firm may
offer a temporary solution, but this approach is ultimately clumsy and
inappropriate. It makes little sense to take a set of laws designed to support
one type of structure, for-profit firms, then take advantage of the default
nature of the rules to create a certificate that signifies something completely
at odds.
III.

SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE

EUROPEAN UNION
The ideal legal structure for social enterprises would be based on the
principles set forth above. The rules would clearly identify the purpose of
social enterprises and set out a structure that supports them-a structure that
includes a blend of governance restrictions, financial limitations, and
75 See supranote 37 and accompanying text.
76 See
77

supra note 39 and accompanying text.
See generally Cass Sunstein, On the Expression Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L.

REV. 2021 (1996).
78 Thomas A.J. McGinn, The Expressive Function of Law and Lex Imperfecta, 11
ROMAN LEGAL TRADITION 1, 1 (2015).
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disclosure requirements. Companies that comply with these rules would
have a clear designation that would signal their social purpose to the market.
In the U.S., there are a patchwork of certificates and legal forms available
to socially-minded companies. While these mechanisms roughly map onto
the outline we describe, they do not concretely define or specifically support
social enterprises. The concept of social enterprise is much better developed
in the EU, but concerns remain. While the basic idea of social enterprise is
broadly consistent among member states, the supporting regulatory
structures vary greatly. Some are too lax; others too strict. More generally,
the lack of uniformity means that there is no precise pan-European definition
of what it means to conduct business as a social enterprise.

A. Social EnterpriseLaw in the UnitedStates
US law does not. distinguish social enterprises from firms that
incorporate a social mission into their business. Social enterprises exist as
an undefined subset of this group. Socially minded companies typically
signal their intentions through a B Corp certification or by incorporating as
benefit corporations.7 9 The scheme is problematic for all socially-minded
firms and wholly inadequate for true social enterprises.

1. B Corp Certification
To earn a B Corp certification, companies must commit to a social
purpose, and demonstrate, and make disclosures related to, their commitment
to stakeholder values.
The social-purpose commitment comes in the form of a declaration of
interdependence. This declaration describes certified B Corps as "purposedriven" firms that "create[] benefit[s] for all stakeholders, not just
1
shareholders." 0 These companies aspire "to do no harm and benefit all.""
To back up this declaration, companies must complete the B Impact
Assessment. 82 The assessment consists of a series of questions related to the
company's impact on various stakeholders and indicates how the company's
impact on those stakeholders compares to other companies. An example
question is "What % of energy (relative to company revenues) was saved in

79 This is a nonexhaustive list. There are also benefit LLCs, flexible purpose
corporations, social purpose corporations, and L3Cs, but these are less common.
See DANA BRAKMAN REISER & STEVEN A. DEAN, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW:
TRUST, PUBLIC BENEFIT, AND CAPITAL MARKETS 61-66 (2017).
80
About B Corps, CERTIFIED B CORP., https://bcorporation.net/about-b-corps

(last

visited Sept. 5, 2020) [https://perma.cc/9VXA-EU52].
81 Id.

CertificationRequirements, CERTIFIED B CORP.,
https://bcorporation.net/certification/meet-the-requirements (last visited Sept. 5,
2020) [https://perma.cc/DAJ5-XYZW].
82
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the last year for your corporate facilities?"83 Companies are measured and
scored against other companies that take the assessment. To qualify, B Corps
must achieve a certain minimum score. 84 Once qualified, they are measured
85
against the assessment every three years and must maintain the minimum.
The score is also made available on B Corp's website, and it is broken
down into categories. For instance, there is a section on workers. Here,
companies are scored on things like "financial security," "career
86
development," and employee "engagement [and] satisfaction."
As part of the process, companies must also complete disclosures about
their industry, whether they have been penalized or fined in connection with
87
their business activities, and whether they engage in questionable activities.
Companies must answer true/false questions like "company or company
88
suppliers do not use any workers who are prisoners."
Within three years of certification, companies must also either
incorporate as a benefit corporation or, in Washington, as a social purpose
company. 89 Those that incorporate as a social purpose company must also
adopt the B Corp legal amendment language.90 The language sets out a
stakeholder agenda for the firm. Companies must amend their governing
documents to include the following purpose: "The purpose of the Company
shall include creating a material positive impact on society and the
environment, taken as a whole, from the business and operations of the
Company."' Companies must further specify that, rather than privilege
shareholder interests, the board of directors must consider the best interests
of a range of constituencies, including employees, customers, the
92
community, society, and the environment.
Although some of the wording is ambiguous, the impact assessment
questions and related disclosure rules more than anything else make clear
that certification is meant for stakeholder-oriented firms. The transparency
83

Step 1: Assess Your Impact, B IMPACT ASSESSMENT,
https://bimpactassessment.net/how-it-works/assess-your-impact#see-samplequestions_(last visited Sept. 5, 2020) [https://perma.cc/LX9C-AKY5].
" CERTIFIED B CORP., supra note 82.
85 Id
' See, e.g., B Impact Report, Patagonia,CERTIFIED B CORP.,
https://bcorporation.net/directory/patagonia-

inc?_ga=2.171954336.1 2 70 3 2 4 50 7 .1595442070-927962066.1595442070 (last

-

visited Sept. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/B8PM-R9ZK].
87
See Disclosure Materials, CERTIFIED B CORP., https://blab-mktg-bcorporationproduction.s3.amazonaws.com/BCorpDisclosureQuestionnaire-blank.pdf (last
visited Sept. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/KGG9-YW8Z].
88 Id.
89
Agreement for B CorporationCertification, B LAB 2 (2018); US Corporation
Washington - No, CERTIFIED B CORP., https://bcorporation.net/us-corporationwashington-no (last visited Sept 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/JV4G-NURE].
' See Agreement for B CorporationCertification,supra note 89.
91 CERTIFIED B CORP., supra note 86.
92
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surrounding stakeholder impact is similar to, yet analytically distinct from,
transparency about the firm's public purpose. The latter involves disclosures
about the firm's impact on its mission rather than on employees and other
stakeholders. This is missing from the B Corp disclosure regime.
The roster of certified companies further supports this conclusion. The
vast majority are not social enterprises. 93 Because B Corp certification is
meant for, and populated by, stakeholder-oriented firms, it is clearly inapt for
social enterprises, which are destined to get lost.

2. Benefit Corporations
Benefit corporations are companies that have formed under a state's
benefit corporation statute rather than its corporate law statute. Thirty-six
states have benefit corporation legislation. 94 B Corp certifications and
benefit corporations are closely related. The certificate is essentially for
companies that already incorporated as for-profit firms (but are willing to
change their legal form to a benefit corporation or social purpose company
within three years) and for those that have formed as benefit corporations or
similar entities and want the imprimatur of certification.
While in practice benefit corporation statutes cast a wide net, the
statutory language makes it sound a lot like the firms are social enterprises.
According to the model benefit corporation statute, "[a] benefit corporation
shall have a purpose of creating general public benefit." 95 The statute goes
on to define "general public benefit" as "[a] material positive impact on
society and the environment, taken as a whole, from the business and
operations of a benefit corporation assessed taking into account the impacts
of the benefit corporation as reported against a third-party standard." 96
Companies may also "identify one or more specific public benefits" that the
company plans to pursue. 97
To reinforce its public commitment, companies also have the power to
elect a benefit officer and director. A benefit officer would put together the
company's annual benefit report in which benefit directors would opine on
such things as "[w]hether the benefit corporation acted in accordance with its
general public benefit purpose and any specific public benefit purpose in all

93 B Corp Directory, CERTIFIED B CORP., https://bcorporation.net/directory (last
visited Sept. 5, 2020) [https://perma.cc/XE5R-L6DN].
94
State by State Status of Legislation, BENEFIT CORP.,
https://benefitcorp.net/policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Sept. 5, 2020)

[https://perma.cc/F8J2-FK5Q].
95 MODEL BENEFIT CORPORATION LEGISLATION, § 201(a) (2017), availableat
https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/fi les/Model%20benefit%2Ocorp%20legislation
%20_4_17_17.pdf [https://perma.cc/7NG6-QURV].
96
Id at § 102. Also, § 401 requires that the company prepare an annual report and
that the report be assessed against a third-party standard.
97

Id at § 201(b).
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material respects." 98 The public-benefit mandate is also backed by an
enforcement mechanism. Shareholders with a certain minimum ownership
stake may sue the corporation, its officers, and directors for injunctive relief
(but not monetary relief) for failure to "pursue or create" a general or specific

public benefit.99

This focus on a public benefit comes within a stakeholder paradigm.
Directors of a benefit corporation are, among other things, instructed to
consider the interests of shareholders, employees, customers, and the
community in their decision-making.1 00 The aforementioned annual report
also includes an assessment of the company's "social and environmental
01
performance" measured against a third-party standard.1 There are a number
02
of third-party standards that benefit corporations can use,' including the B
impact assessment tool used for the B Corp certificate.
Despite rhetorical flourishes in the statute suggesting the contrary, as
with B Corp certifications, a look at the companies that have incorporated as
benefit corporations shows that it is the stakeholder orientation that defines
them rather than their mission. While a number of companies have chosen
the benefit corporation form, only a few would qualify as social enterprises
as we have defined the term. 103 Rather, a benefit corporation is typically one
that has chosen to run its business sustainably, with an eye toward
stakeholders, not merely shareholders. Patagonia, for example, is a benefit
corporation.1 ' While laudable, such firms do not specifically put a social
mission first, nor do they necessarily have a particular social mission in mind.
Ultimately, benefit corporations and B Corp certifications serve as
complementary and overlapping mechanisms for firms to signal their
commitment to social values. The structure fits the outline for social
enterprises that we describe in Part I. As we suggest, these mechanisms

98 Id

at § 302(c)(1).

9 Id at §§ 102, 301(c), 305(a)(1), 305(c).
'00 Benefit Corporations:FrequentlyAsked Questions, B LAB,

200

fficers_6
https://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/FAQs%20Directors%20and%
("By
_17.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/K7NH-D6L3]
committing to consider the interests of other stakeholders, a benefit corporation
may create value through employee engagement, customer loyalty and similar
attributes, thereby improving outcomes for all stakeholders -- including the owners.
Furthermore, certain profit making opportunities may not be available without a
true commitment to other stakeholders.").
101 MODEL BENEFIT CORPORATION LEGISLATION, supra note 95, at
102

§ 401(a)(2).

How Do I Pick a Third PartyStandard, BENEFIT CORP.,

https://benefitcorp.net/how-do-i-pick-third-party-standard (last visited Sept. 6,
2020) [https://perma.cc/3J2T-C7M5].
103 See Find a Benefit Corp, BENEFIT CORP.,
https://benefitcorp.net/businesses/find-a-benefit-corp (last visited Sept. 29, 2020)

[https://perma.cc/9FQ6-8Y58].
104 B Lab, PATAGONIA, https://www.patagonia.com/b-lab.html (last visited Sept. 6,
2020) [https://perma.cc/Q3KW-UP5K].
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reorient corporate purpose and create an accountability and transparency
structure to support socially minded firms.
But this multilevel structure comes with a few major drawbacks. One
drawback of certification is its reliance on B Corp as both the standard setter
and enforcer of its standard. To remain viable, it must strike a balance
between credibility and relevance. Credibility depends on relatively strict
standards, but if the standards are too strict, there will be too few firms for
the certificate to be meaningful and viable. A drawback of both B Corp
certifications and benefit corporations is that the overlap between them
undoubtedly creates consumer and investor confusion. Finally, the biggest
drawback for social enterprises is that neither structure fits them. Because
firms of varying levels of social-mindedness make use of these structures,
they do not serve to distinguish social enterprises from firms with a much
more limited connection to a social cause.

B. Social Enterprise in European Union
The concept of social enterprise is much more well-understood in the
EU, where these organizations have a long history. Social enterprises
originally arose as a way to fight unemployment among traditionally
excluded groups' 05-and this remains the most common mission. 106
Sixteen EU countries have legal forms that roughly capture social
enterprises. 107 Many countries use a definition of social enterprise that aligns
with our proposal.
For example, Denmark has "Registered Social
Enterprises."' 08 These firms are required to have a "social purpose." 109 Italy
is similar. 1 0 Many countries do not stop there. They specify the types of
missions that social enterprises must pursue. In line with their history, the
most prevalent specified mission is employment of disadvantaged groups.
For the most part, EU social enterprise law does not conflate social
mission with corporate social responsibility. This might be because social
responsibility is already part of corporate law and culture. It could also stem
from the European conception of corporate purpose. As discussed above, it
is operational rather than abstract."' Social enterprises are social enterprises
because they are structured in a way that supports the company's mission.
This structure leaves no room for ambiguity about the firm's social-purpose
commitment.

The drafting that puts mission first, however, is not always perfectly
clear. In Slovenia, for instance, profits must not be the exclusive or main
Defourny & Nyssens, supra note 5, at 34.
06 EUR. COMM'N, supra note 18, at ix.
10 7 EUR. SOC. ENTER. L. ASS'N, SOCIAL ENTERPRISE IN EUROPE: DEVELOPING
105

LEGAL SYSTEMS WHICH SUPPORT SOCIAL ENTERPRISE GROWTH 10

108 EUR. COMM'N, supra note 18, at 58 box 5.1.
09
' See id
10 See id
'" See supratext accompanying notes 4141-44.

(2015).
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objective.1 2 Because the definition does not clearly require that profits are
subsidiary to a social mission, the language is ambiguous.
Country laws include various accountability mechanisms to align
management with the firm's social mission. But the rules are patchy. Some
countries specify inclusive mission-driven governance practices.11 3 France,
for instance, requires that board membership include workers, users, and a
final group that aligns directly with the company's mission."4 Italy includes
a similar requirement." 5 Many countries lack such concreteness, however.
Instead, they simply mandate that social enterprises adhere to principles of
democratic governance." 6
Italy is the only country with a mandatory and standardized disclosure
18
scheme." 7 But compliance is reportedly weak. The majority of countries
19
do not incorporate disclosure into their regulatory scheme.
20
France, for
Financial limitations, however, are fairly common.'
instance, uses detailed requirements related to operating expenses and
22
In the Czech
financial ratios.12 ' It also caps executive compensation.
toward the
allocated
be
to
need
profits
of
Republic, at least fifty-one percent
23
to
distributions
any
Some countries disallow
firm's mission.1
24
This clearly goes too far as it turns social enterprises into
shareholders.1
nonprofits.
In addition to the wide variation in substantive requirements, EU
2
countries diverge on the mechanisms of social enterprise law.1 Some take
a certificate-style approach. In these countries, firms can earn social
enterprise status regardless of their legal form so long as they comply with
the relevant criteria.1 2 6 Belgium, Denmark, and Finland, for instance, take
this approach. 2 7 Other countries, like Greece, France, and Poland, have
enacted specific legal forms.2 8 As noted previously, legal forms are the
superior approach. There is an incongruence of corporate purpose when a
12 EUR. COMM'N, supra note 1818, at 58 box 5.1.
113 Defourny & Nyssens, supra note 55, at 18.
"4 Defourny & Nyssens, supra note 55, at 19 n. 32.
"5 EUR. COMM'N, supra note 18, at 114.

16 Id 18annex 2 at 109-18.
117 Id at 87 & tbl. 5.6.
" 8 1d at 87.18

1191d.18
120 See id 18 at 56.
121 See EUR. SOC. ENTER. L. ASS'N, supra note 107, at 26.
122 See id.
123 EUR. COMM'N, supranote 1818, annex 2 at 110; Ebrahim et al., supra note
4848, at 86 (noting CICs are capped at 35%).
124 Defourny & Nyssens, supranote 55, at 47-48 n.21; EUR. COMM'N, supra note

1818, at 56.
125

EUR. COMM'N, supra note

126

Id
Id

127

128 Id

1818, at 51.

2020]

SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW

25

social enterprise label is layered on top of for-profit firms. This is true even
in European countries where even for-profit firms have a stakeholder
orientation.
It is beyond the scope of this essay to pick apart the laws of each country,
but this brief review illustrates the gap between current law and the standards
of accountability and transparency we outlined in Part I. Countries could
more clearly define social enterprises, more specifically outline missioncentric governance practices, more narrowly tailor financial limitations, and
implement mandatory disclosure requirements. In addition, the disharmony
of the rules means that there is no clarity of what constitutes a social
enterprise across the EU.
The lack of uniformity limits the potential impact of these laws. One
reason for the formation of the EU was to lower the cost of doing business
across EU countries. The lack of harmonization here creates the same
problem. Potential social enterprise investors from one EU country cannot
easily invest in social enterprises in another. For locally targeted firms, this
may not be overly disconcerting. Investors from abroad may have little
interest. But some social enterprises have much broader ambitions. For
these, a recognizable and credible EU regulatory framework would be
beneficial.

C. European Union Proposal
In July 2018, the EU Parliament recommended that the European
Community adopt a_ "social economy label." This builds on programs in
place since 2011 to support social enterprises. 12 9
To receive the label, an entity must meet the following criteria:
(a) the organisation should be a private law entity established in whichever
form available in Member States and under EU law, and should be
independent from the State and public authorities;
(b) its purpose must be essentially focused on the general interest or public
utility;
(c) it should essentially conduct a socially useful and solidarity-based
activity, i.e. via its activities it should aim to provide support to vulnerable
groups, to combat social exclusion, inequality and violations of fundamental
rights, including at the international level, or to help protect the environment,
biodiversity, the climate and natural resources;

1 29 See EUR. COMM'N, SOCIAL ENTERPRISES,

http://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/social-economy/enterprisesen
6, 2020) [https://perma.cc/KNH7-MTH9].
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(d) it should be subject to an at least partial constraint on profit distribution
and to specific rules on the allocation of profits and assets during its entire
life, including at dissolution; in any case, the majority of the profits made by
the undertaking should be reinvested or otherwise used to achieve its social
purpose;
(e) it should be governed in accordance with democratic governance models
involving its employees, customers and stakeholders affected by its
activities; members' power and weight in decision-making may not be based
on the capital they may hold;
The European Parliament considers that nothing prevents conventional
undertakings from being awarded the European Social Economy Label if
they comply with the above-mentioned requirements, in particular regarding
30
their object, the distribution of profits, governance and decision-making.
The proposal also recommends that such entities be required to post an
annual report "on their activities, results, involvement of stakeholders,
allocation of profits, salaries, subsidies, and other benefits received.""'
The EU proposal is a close fit to our definition of social enterprise and
how law should support it. It provides a label for true social enterprises and
appropriate credibility mechanisms. It falls short, however, in two areas.
The first is that the label may overlay any type of business entity. This
ignores the fundamentally different corporate purpose that motivates social
enterprises.
Second, the ambiguity of its requirements significantly drains the label
of value. The proposal leaves to member states the task of specifying such
things as governance requirements, limits on profit distributions, and the
substance of the disclosure requirement.1 32 This flexibility undermines the
signaling function of the label. As just discussed, countries have vastly
33
That being the case, investors
different requirements in these regards.
would not know how committed any particular entity is to its social purpose
goals without further research.
The EU can cure each of these problems by creating objective rules for
each of its requirements. This would provide potential investors and
consumers with far more guidance. Further still, it could create its own EU
entity, along the lines of the European Company. This would clear up any
130 European Parliament Resolution of 5 July 2018 With Recommendations to the
Commission on a Statute for Social and Solidarity-Based Enterprises
(2016/2237(INL)), Recommendation 1.
131 Id at Recommendation 4.
132 See J S Liptrap, EuropeanParliamentRecommends CreatingEU-Wide Social
EnterpriseLegal Status - A Misstep?, OXFORD Bus. L. BLOG (Sept. 21, 2018),
https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/business-law-blog/blog/2018/09/european-parliamentrecommends-creating-eu-wide-social-enterprise [https://perma.cc/9BUG-RA77].
"33 See supra text accompanying notes 112-25.
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doubt about the definition and regulation of social enterprises across the
continent.

D. Summary of ComparativeInsights
The above analysis shows that the US and EU have opposite strengths
and weaknesses. US law in the vicinity of social enterprise tends to have
strong substantive requirements. The B Corp transparency scheme, for
instance, is laudable. But because the requirements are linked to social
mindedness, the law is inapt for true social enterprises-those that put
mission above all else. They are lost in a sea of firms with varying
commitments to social causes.
In the EU, the concept of social enterprise is well defined. But the
substantive requirements are too-often toothless. This similarly undermines
the value of social enterprise law. Just as in the US, investors and consumers
do not know what they are getting with a social enterprise. The answer on
both continents is US-style substantive requirements tailored to fit the EU
definition of social enterprise.
*** A WORD ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

Some may argue that the true challenge is to make traditional for-profit
firms more socially responsible-or more controversially, to end shareholder
primacy. This essay does not contravene this goal. At its core, it argues for
clear and transparent legal rules that fit social enterprises. The label, "social
enterprise," would be available to only those firms that meet the strict criteria.
Socially responsible firms could still earn labels that accurately characterize
their values. They just no longer would be conflated with social enterprises.
The only firms potentially harmed would be those trading off confusion as to
the extent of their commitment to the social good. This is not a group about
which we should be concerned. And any loss in value to these firms should
be more than made up for by the gain in value that accrues to those firms that
are able to truly signal their intentions. Indeed, this is the logic behind much
of market regulation.134
Strong social enterprise regulation is a
complementary avenue to more sustainable business.
IV. CONCLUSION

This essay defined social enterprises and set out a model for how
regulations can support them. It then assessed US and EU laws against this
model. Both legal regimes fall far short, but in completely different ways.
The US has yet to instantiate the concept of social enterprise into its laws.
1 3 4 See generally George A. Akerlof, The Marketfor "Lemons": Quality
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. EcoN. 488 (1970) (arguing that
quality uncertainty undermines markets and justifies market regulation).
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European countries understand social enterprise but do not have strong rules
to support them. The normative takeaway is clear-both continents need a
clear definition of social enterprise backed by regulations that match the
definition. We provide a roadmap.
Our discussion only skims the surface of this vast and underappreciated
topic. In putting social good above profits, social enterprise is a paradigm
shift. Flipping these two motives represent a different way of organizing
economic activity that somewhat uncomfortably challenges the basics of
economics, markets, and firms. While social enterprises are a small fragment
of the global economy, they represent a big idea. Perhaps the absence of
thoughtful regulation is what holds them back from realizing their
considerable conceptual appeal.

